Homespun Symposium IV

The latest installment of the Homespun Symposium deals with the apparent realignment of forces in the international community.

The war on terror and the war in Iraq have caused deep fissures through the international political landscape, but arguably not simply and predictably "left" versus "right"; after all, President Bush is allied with a social democrat Tony Blair and ex-communists of Eastern Europe, while the anti-war coalition is also a motley crew of American and British paleo-conservatives, European right (France) and left (Germany) and many others.

So what does it all mean? What is the new divide in international politics? And will it last?

I believe that the "new divide" in an international politics is difficult to perceive because it has become a three-way split. Also, as these alignment changes are relatively recent they have not yet become deeply fixed. International players are still "trying out" positions, and are being purposefully ambiguous as a safety measure. The only really clearly defined global conflict at work in the world today, the American "War on Terror", is between a country (with allies at various levels of commitment) and a vague, largely hidden group of individuals. This allows most countries (excepting of course the United States) a lot of "wiggle room" in how they position themselves. Ambiguity is much prized and international politics, and they are making full use of what's available.

The end of the Cold War pulled the support out from under the old East versus West alignments leading to a more fluid situation where countries have experimented with new positions and alliances. Certainly there can be no argument that much if not most of the post-Cold War international positioning revolves around the United States. The US becomes the one fixed reference point about which a constellation of dependable allies and occasional supporters orbit. It's not surprising that some of the most committed allies of the US are countries that only recently regained their freedom. Being new players in international politics, they are eager to gain stature quickly and stand close to the US hoping to earn its attention and gain stature through political proximity.

The rise of a single great power like the US will naturally trigger a balancing response. A number of the older world powers have nominated themselves as a counterbalancing force against American global supremacy. They're not in any way a well-defined and cohesive alliance, acting together only when they move to restrain the American activity. As a group that they are not overtly hostile to the US, perhaps better characterized as "competitors" rather than enemies. I would include France, Germany, Russia, China, India, and perhaps even Japan, in this group. A large number of the smaller nations, eager to see the US brought down a rung, will side with this loose "coalition" when it suits them.

The third performer in this global "dance" is the radical Muslim "jihad" movement. In prior decades this conflict was primarily a regional struggle directed against Israel. Over the years the struggle has become increasingly global. The Russians have fought a Muslim war in Afghanistan and an ongoing military struggle in Chechnya, but the dominant target these days is the United States. The decision to focus on America has more to do with international politics than with any specific complaint against the US. Posturing and maneuvering around the United States is the "big leagues" of international politics. A conflict with any other country, even a country as large and powerful as Russia or India, is still very much a sidelight, but a conflict with the United States brings one right to center stage and full spotlight. The jihad movement has made in itself a defining element in the new global alignment simply by doing what no other nation or faction was willing to do, directly attack the single superpower.

It may well turn out to have been a suicidal maneuver, and this period of Muslim extremism and international aggression may turn out to be little more than a chapter in history books. But it will get its chapter, which is much more than many similar groups will attain. In the meantime, the United States is preoccupied with defending itself, and the large, cloud-like, mass of "other powers" are circling about, like scavengers watching a lion kill, maximizing ambiguity while they wait to see what develops. Something approximating a coalition has "coalesced", trying to be anti-terror and antiwar, in favor of Iraqi democracy but suspicious of an election safeguarded by the American military force, against murderous insurgents but also against American efforts to put down the insurgency. In other words, they want to maximize ambiguity. That elements of the Islamic world have taken to open conflict with the US frees the "other powers" from the need to resist the US more directly. Their role shifts from "opposing" to "disapproving", which is much safer. As mentioned in the question above, this brings them into temporary overlap with the habitual disapprovers in the US and Britain. As the jihad wanes, however, these balancing global powers will shift towards more active opposition and the current "motley crew" of the antiwar coalition will break up.